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We examine a static one-risk-free-one-risky asset portfolio choice when the investor’s well-
being is affected by the anticipatory feelings associated to potential capital gains and losses. 
These feelings can be manipulated by the choice of subjective beliefs on the distribution of 
returns. However, the bias of these endogenous subjective beliefs induces the choice of a 
portfolio that is suboptimal with respect to the objective expected utility of final wealth. We 
characterize the structure of these optimal beliefs. We first show that optimal subjective 
beliefs must be degenerated with only two possible returns. Moreover, under some weak 
conditions on the utility function, these two atoms are at the lower and upper bounds of the 
objectively feasible returns. When the intensity of anticipatory feelings is small, the formation 
of beliefs must be biased in favor of optimism, which implies an increase in the equilibrium 
demand for the risky asset. We also show that the optimal beliefs are approximately 
independent of the investor’s degree of risk aversion. 
JEL Code: D81. 
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This paper has greatly benefited from discussions with Jacques Drèze, Larry Epstein, Jean-
Jacques Laffont and Marc Machina. 1I n t r o d u c t i o n
I nt h el a t eX I X t hc e n t u r y ,E m i l eC o u ´ e, a french psychologist at the University
of Nancy, promoted the idea that learning to control our thoughts can do
much to improve well-being. Positive thinking does improve the quality of life
of patients with a life-threatening disease by inducing them to reduce their
subjective probability of dying. The so-called ”method Cou´ e” has however
an important undesirable eﬀect. By artiﬁcially downgrading the risk, the
patient may spend less eﬀort to ﬁght the illness. Psychotherapists are well
aware of the problem, as most of them forcefully claim that the method does
never replace the medical treatment.
Learning to play with our illusions is important but dangerous for our
well-being. In his famous book entitled ”The Gambler”, Dosto¨ ievsky de-
s c r i b e say o u n gm i d d l e - c l a s sm a nw h od r e a m st h a th ew i l lb e c o m ew e a l t h y
by gambling one day at the casino. However, he perfectly knows that the
odds at the casino are unfair, as he forcefully advises other people not to gam-
ble. This illustrates what Sigmund Freud will describe sixty years later as
illusions, i.e., beliefs that establish themselves by the will of our desires. The
gambler’s optimism allows him to survive in a world of pretentious wealthy
Russian expatriates. However, relying on his subjective beliefs that he knows
to be optimistic compared to the objective chances, he eventually decides to
gamble, and looses everything.
In this paper, we want to apply these ideas to other choice problems under
uncertainty. In particular, we examine the portfolio choice problem of risk-
averse consumers.1 In order to ﬁt with the ideas developed by Dosto¨ ievsky,
Cou´ e and Freud among else, we use a model introduced recently by Brun-
nermeier and Parker (2003). We recognize that current felicity is aﬀected by
the anticipation of future pleasures and displeasures. As a consequence, con-
trolling our thoughts about the likelihood of these events has a direct eﬀect
on welfare. In a portfolio context, positive thinking implies a mental ma-
nipulation of the objective probability distribution of assets returns. If the
1Alternative interpretations of our choice problem can be found in insurance economics
and in the theory of investment. A consumer faces a risk of loss for which there exists
an insurance market oﬀering proportional insurance contracts with an actuarially unfair
tariﬀ. The problem of the consumer is to select the rate of insurance coverage for the
risk. In the theory of investment, a risk-averse entrepreneur with a linear technology must
determine the optimal capacity of production under uncertainty about the output price.
1investor has a positive demand for stocks, method Cou´ e means increasing
the subjective probability of a positive excess return. The undesirable eﬀect
of positive thinking is that this manipulation of beliefs is likely to aﬀect the
asset allocation of the investor. This in turn aﬀects negatively the investor’s
future felicity. We assume that the investor selects subjective beliefs in order
to maximize his lifetime well-being which is an increasing function of both
current and future felicities. Because positive thinking raises current felicity
but reduces future felicity, the problem of method Cou´ ei st od e t e r m i n et h e
best compromise between these two opposite forces.
This work departs from the long tradition in economics to measure an
individual’s lifetime utility has a discounted sum of the ﬂow of felicity gener-
ated by direct consumption, as described for example by Samuelson (1937).
This tradition is incompatible with the idea that happiness is extracted not
only from the immediate consumption of goods and services, but also from
thoughts. This is particularly the case for thoughts related to savoring the
possibility of future pleasant events, or to fearing anxiously the consequences
of adverse ones. Anticipatory feelings have been incorporated in preferences
by Caplin and Leahy (2001) who considered belief-dependent felicity func-
tions. In the economic literature, Akerlof and Dickens (1982) were the ﬁrst to
assume that subjective beliefs are derived from a welfare-maximizing process.
The distortion of beliefs aﬀects the individual decision process in a com-
plex manner. There is an important literature on the eﬀect of a change in
the perceived distribution of risk on the optimal exposure to it. In the case
of the one-riskfree-one-risky portfolio choice problem that we examine in this
paper, Rothschild and Stiglitz (1971) have shown that a mean-preserving
spread in the distribution of returns of the risky asset does not necessarily
reduce the demand for the risky asset. In the same fashion, Fishburn and
Porter (1976) have shown that a ﬁrst-order stochastically favorable shift in
this distribution can reduce the demand for the risky asset by some risk-
averse investors. Gollier (1995) characterizes the stochastic dominance order
that yields a reduction of the demand for the risky asset by all risk-averse
agents. More recently, Abel (2002) considered the eﬀect of distorted beliefs
on the equilibrium asset prices. Abel deﬁned optimism by using very spe-
ciﬁc ﬁrst-order stochastic dominant shifts in the subjective distribution of
the risky asset’s payoﬀs. He showed that optimism raises the demand for this
asset, thereby reducing the equity premium. This observation is particularly
important in our framework as we will show that risk-averse agents optimally
2distort the distribution of the risky asset in an optimistic way.
Our model is a two-date version of the dynamic model examined by Brun-
nermeier and Parker (2003), hereafter denoted BP. Because consumption
takes place only at date 2 in our model, we are not able to examine the eﬀect
of optimal illusions on savings and consumption. We assume that the con-
sumer’s lifetime utility is a weighted sum of the date-1 felicity extracted from
savoring and of the date-2 felicity of consumption. The weight measures the
intensity of anticipatory feelings, anxiety and savoring. This parameter can
take any value between 0 and 1, whereas BP only consider the special case
with equal weights. This will allow us to explore the eﬀect of increasing an-
ticipatory feelings on optimal beliefs and on the demand for the risky asset.
Assuming without loss of generality that the objective expected excess return
of the risky asset is positive, any risk-averse investor with a zero intensity
of anticipatory feeling will have a positive demand α∗ for the risky asset.
The main result of BP is to show that risk-averse investors with anticipatory
feelings will always distort beliefs, and that they will do so in such a way
either to increase their demand of the risky asset above α∗, or to go short
on the risky asset. In this paper, we provide an in-depth description of the
optimal subjective distribution of beliefs, and we show that it is not optimal
to go short on the risky asset.
We ﬁrst exploit the linearity of expected utility with respect to state prob-
abilities to prove that the optimal subjective probability distribution must
be degenerated with at most two atoms, i.e., optimal beliefs are binary. This
result is true for any von Neumann-Morgenstern preference functional, any
intensity of anticipatory feelings, and any objective distribution of the risky
asset. In a second step, we show under weak restrictions on the utility func-
tion that investors select the two atoms that are at the bounds of the set
of possible asset returns. In other words, optimally controlling thoughts lead
individual to believe that only the smallest possible return and the largest
possible return can have a positive probability to occur. This strong result
is compatible with the idea introduced by Tversky and Kahneman (1992)
that the worst and best outcomes receive particular attention from decision
makers. The cumulative prospect theory takes this into account by assum-
ing an inverse S-shaped transformation function of the objective cumulative
distribution function. This is equivalent to transferring the probability mass
from the interior of the support of the distribution to its lower and upper
3bounds.2 We show in this paper that this typical distortion of probabilities
can be explained by a welfare-optimizing process of human beings with von
Neumann-Morgenstern preferences.
Given the fact that optimal beliefs are degenerated at the extreme events,
the only remaining problem is to determine the subjective probability of the
best state. When the intensity of anticipatory feelings is small, we show that
the demand for the risky asset is larger than the demand that is optimal
under the objective distribution of excess returns. Thus, we eliminate the
possibility allowed by BP that risk-averse investors go short on the risky
asset. Moreover, we show that the optimal subjective probability of the large
return and the demand for the risky asset are increasing in the intensity of
anticipatory feelings.
Things are more complex when we allow for larger intensities of anticipa-
tory feelings. It is well-known that the maximum subjective expected utility
of the investor is a convex function of his subjective probability distribution.
For example, this explains why the value of information is always positive,
or why reﬁning the information structure ` al aB l a c k w e l l ( 1 9 5 1 )m a k e st h e
decision-maker better oﬀ. The convexity of the felicity extracted from antic-
ipatory feelings with respect to the subjective probability distribution alerts
us about an important diﬃculty of the selection of optimal beliefs, since
the objective function does not need anymore to be concave in the decision
variables. In the extreme case where only anticipatory feelings matter for life-
time well-being, optimal beliefs degenerate to subjective certainty at either
the worse or best possible return, yielding an inﬁnite demand for the risky
asset and unbounded well-being. When the intensity of anticipatory feelings
is smaller than unity, the Inada assumption that marginal utility tends to
inﬁnity when consumption tends to zero guarantees that the actual demand
for the risky asset will be small enough to yield positive consumption in all
states with a positive objective probability. This implies that optimal beliefs
cannot degenerate to certainty.
The nonconcavity of the consumer’s lifetime objective has not been pointed
out by BP. This non-concavity may generate various interesting results. For
example, we show that Head-or-Tail games with a fair coin can make con-
sumers mutually better oﬀ in spite of their risk aversion. This requires that
anticipatory feelings count more than actual consumption in measuring life-
2For more details, see for example Tversky and Wakker (1995) and Abdellaoui (2000).
4time well-being. This implies that it has two symmetric maximal subjective
probabilities p1 > 1/2a n dp2 =1− p1 < 1/2 for the Head state. Therefore,
there exists a competitive equilibrium where half of the population bets on
Head and selects subjective probability p1 of Head, whereas the other half
of the population bets on Tail and selects subjective probability p2 of Head.
Because all stakes optimally selected by consumers are equal, the market for
bets clears at a zero participation fee. This competitive equilibrium makes
all agents better oﬀ compared to an economy where no such gambling op-
portunity is oﬀered. Notice that when the intensity of anticipatory feelings
is less than 1/2, the lifetime objective function of consumers is globally con-
cave and no such bifurcation occurs. The optimal beliefs are equal to the
objective ones in this case. This is another striking diﬀerence with respect to
BP’s Proposition 1(ii) that states that optimal beliefs are always distortions
of the objective probability distributions.
2 The model
Our model is static, with a decision date t = 0 and a consumption date
t = 1. At date 0, the consumer selects an asset portfolio. The portfolio is
liquidated at date 1, and its value is consumed. We consider an economy with
two assets. The ﬁrst asset is riskfree and yields a return that is normalized
to 0 over the period. The second asset is risky. It yields a random excess
return e x at date 1. It is assumed that the excess return of the risky asset is
bounded downwards by a<0 and upwards by b>0. There is an objective
cumulative probability distribution Q ∈ X[a,b]f o re x. X[a,b] denotes the set
of cumulative distribution functions whose support is in [a,b]:
X[a,b]=
½





The consumer has a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function u that
is assumed to be twice diﬀerentiable, increasing and concave. We as-
sume that the Inada conditions are satisﬁed, with limc→0+ u0(c)=+ ∞ and
limc→∞ u0(c) = 0. The decision problem of the agent at date t =0i st o
determine the size α of his investment in the risky asset. Because his initial
wealth is w0, he invests the remaining w0 − α in the riskfree asset. His ﬁnal
wealth at date 1 in state s is therefore equal to w0 + αe x. At decision date
5t =0 , the beliefs of the consumer is characterized by a subjective cumula-
tive probability distribution P ∈ X[a,b]t h a tm a yd i ﬀer from the objective
probability distribution Q. Given these beliefs P, the consumer selects the
portfolio (α,w 0−α) that maximizes his subjective future expected utility on
consumption. We obtain the following decision problem:
S(P)=m a x
α EPu(w0 + αe x)=
Z b
a
u(w0 + αx)dP(x). (1)
The expectation operator EP refers to the subjective probability distribution
P. S(P) measures the felicity at date t = 0 generated by anticipatory feel-
ings. The optimal demand for the risky asset as a function of the beliefs is
denoted α(P). It satisﬁes the following ﬁrst-order condition:
EPe xu
0(w0 + α(P)e x)=0 . (2)
Because EPu(w0+αe x)i sc o n c a v ei nα,t h i sﬁrst-order condition is necessary
and suﬃcient for optimality. By the Inada condition, it must be true that
w0 + α(P)x>0 for all x with a positive subjective probability dP(x).
Because of the potential bias in the subjective beliefs, the objective ex-
pected utility of the consumer at date 1 may diﬀer from S(P). The objective
expected utility of a consumer with subjective beliefs P equals
O(P)=EQu(w0 + α(P)e x)=
Z b
a
u(w0 + α(P)x)dQ(x). (3)
It is important to observe that the consumer’s objective expected utility
depends upon the subjective probability distribution P only through the
choice of the portfolio allocation induced by P.
We now specify the lifetime well-being of the consumer with subjective
beliefs P.A t d a t e t = 0, the consumer savors his subjective future utility,
yielding savoring felicity S(P)a tt h a td a t e .A td a t et = 1, the agent extracts
felicity O(P) from consuming his terminal wealth. His lifetime well-being W
is assumed to be a convex combination of his felicity at these two dates:
W(P)=kS(P)+( 1− k)O(P). (4)
Parameter k measures the intensity of anticipatory feelings in lifetime util-
ity. When k =0 , the consumer has no anticipatory feeling at date 0. When
6k = 1, he extracts felicity just from savoring future consumption ﬂows. Brun-
nermeier and Parker (2003) consider the special case with k =1 /2.
As justiﬁed in the introduction, we assume that prior to date t =0 ,
the agent controls his thoughts. He selects the beliefs P that maximizes his
lifetime well-being:
P
∗ =m a x
P∈X[a,b]
W(P). (5a)
The optimal demand for the risky asset is α∗ = α(P∗). The main objective
of the paper is to compare P∗ to Q,a n dα∗ to α(Q).
3 Some basic properties of optimal beliefs
As stated before, date-1 felicity depends upon beliefs P only through its
eﬀect on the choice of the optimal portfolio α = α(P)a td a t et =0 . I n
general, there are more than one probability distribution that yield that
optimal portfolio α.L e tB(α) ⊂ X[a,b] be the set of subjective cumulative
probability distributions that yield the same optimal portfolio choice α:
B(α)={P ∈ X[a,b] | α(P)=α}. (6)
It implies that O(P)=O(P0) for all (P,P0)i nB(α).
This observation has an important consequence on the structure of op-
t i m a lb e l i e f s . C o n s i d e rt h eo p t i m a ld e m a n dα∗ = α(P∗) that is induced
by the optimal subjective beliefs P∗. From the various subjective probabil-
ity distributions P that yields this demand α∗, the one that is selected by
the consumer prior to date 0 must maximize the date-0 anticipatory felicity
S(P), since they all yield the same date-1 felicity O(P∗). In other words, it
must be true that
P
∗ ∈ arg max
P∈B(α∗)
S(P). (7)
Observe that this property of optimal beliefs holds independent of the char-
acteristics of the objective probability distribution Q.I ta l l o w su st od e r i v e
the following useful properties of optimal beliefs.
3.1 Optimal beliefs must be binary
Proposition 1 The optimal subjective probability distribution P∗ has at most
two atoms: ∃(x−,x +) ∈ [a,0[×]0,b] such that dP∗(x)=0for all x ∈ [a,b]
7except at x− and x+.

















dP(x) ≥ 0 ∀x ∈ [a,b].
The ﬁrst constraint states that P belongs to B(α∗), i.e., that beliefs P yield
the optimal risk exposure α∗. The other two constraints deﬁne a cumulative
probability distribution. Because the feasible set is compact, this problem has
a solution. Observe that the above program is a linear programming problem
on a compact set with two equality constraints. As is well-known, its solution
has at most two atoms. In order to satisfy the ﬁrst-order condition, it must
be that x− and x+ alternate in sign.¥
Thus, we conclude from this proposition that the optimal subjective be-
liefs take the form P∗ =( x−,1 − p∗;x+,p∗)f o rs o m ep a i r( x−,x +)a n ds o m e
scalar p∗ such that a ≤ x− < 0 <x + ≤ b and p∗ ∈ [0,1]. It is linked








∗x−)=0 ( 9 )
Proposition 1 is useful because it replaces the problem of ﬁnding a proba-
bility distribution in the inﬁnite dimensional space X[a,b]i n t oap r o b l e mo f
ﬁnding a triplet (x−,x +,p) that maximizes W(P). From the technique pre-
sented above, we can easily derive the following property of optimal beliefs:
when there are n independent assets in the economy, there must be at most
n states with a positive optimal subjective probability.
83.2 Only the extreme returns may have a positive sub-
jective probability
In this section, we ﬁrst show that at least one of the two subjectively pos-
sible returns must be at the bounds of interval [a,b]. We deﬁne A(z)=
−u00(z)/u0(z) as the Arrow-Pratt index of absolute risk aversion.
Proposition 2 The optimal subjective distribution P∗ =( x−,1−p∗;x+,p∗) ∈
X[a,b] is such that either x− = a or x+ = b.
Proof: Suppose by contradiction that x− >aand x+ <b .C o n s i d e r a
marginal change in P such that the marginal increase in x+ is compensated
by a marginal reduction in x− in such a way that α∗ is unaﬀected. Fully
diﬀerentiating condition (9) yields
dx−
dx+




(1 − p∗)u0(w0 + α∗x−)
1 − α∗x+A(w0 + α∗x+)
1 − α∗x−A(w0 + α∗x−)
.






Fully diﬀerentiating this equality yields
dS
dx+


























x+A(w0 + α∗x+) − x−A(w0 + α∗x−)
1 − x−A(w0 + α∗x−)
.
Because x− < 0 <x + and A(.) > 0, this is unambiguously positive. This
change in beliefs increases the lifetime well-being of the consumer, which is
a contradiction.¥
This result states that at least one of the two possible returns must
be an extreme return a or b. In the next proposition, we claim that the
two subjectively possible returns are extreme under some mild additional
assumptions on the utility function. We deﬁne relative risk aversion as
R(z)=zA(z)=−zu00(z)/u0(z). It is weakly increasing if R0(.)i su n i f o r m l y
non-negative.
9Proposition 3 Suppose that absolute risk aversion is decreasing (DARA)
and that relative risk aversion is weakly increasing (IRRA). Then, the optimal
subjective distribution of returns has support {a,b}: ∃p∗ ∈ [0,1] such that P∗
is distributed as (a,1 − p∗;b,p∗).
Proof: Suppose by contradiction that x− >aor x+ <b .S u p p o s e f o r
example that x+ is less than b. We consider a marginal increase in x+ that
is compensated by a change in p∗ in such a way that α∗ be unaﬀected by the
change. Fully diﬀerentiating equation (9) yields
dp∗
dx+
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
α∗
= −
p∗u0(w0 + α∗x+)[1− α∗x+A(w0 + α∗x+)]
x+u0(w0 + α∗x+) − x−u0(w0 + α∗x−)
. (10)
By deﬁnition of the subjective expected utility, we have that
dS
dx+






∗x+)+[ u(w0 + α




¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
α∗
.











∗x+) − u(w0 + α
∗x−)]
is positive. Observe that, by risk aversion,









∗ [u(w0 + α







∗ [u(w0 + α






We show that the right-hand side of this equality is positive. Obviously,
α∗ [u(w0 + α∗x+) − u(w0 + α∗x−)] is positive. The second bracketed term in
t h er i g h t - h a n ds i d eo ft h ea b o v ee q u a l i t y is also positive since, by assumption,
R0 is non-negative and A0 is negative. We conclude that K is positive for all
positive x+. Therefore, this change in beliefs raises the lifetime well-being of
the decision maker, a contradiction. A parallel proof can be made when x−
is larger than a. ¥
10The familiar set of power utility functions u(z)=z1−γ/(1 − γ) exhibits
constant relative risk aversion and decreasing absolute risk aversion. There-
fore, it satisﬁes the condition of the above proposition. More generally, de-
creasing absolute risk aversion is commonly accepted by the profession as
a reasonable assumption. Nondecreasing relative risk aversion is compati-
ble with the observation that, conditional to holding a portfolio, wealthier
consumers invest a smaller share of their wealth in stocks.3
In the remainder of the paper, we will assume that the optimal subjective
probability distribution is of the form (a,1−p∗;b,p∗). It remains to determine
the last degree of freedom, which is the probability p∗ of the state with the
highest possible return x = b. Using an intuitive shortcut in notation, we
can rewrite the problem of selecting subjective beliefs as
p
∗ ∈ argmax
p W(p;k)=kS(p)+( 1− k)O(p)( 1 1 )
with
S(p)=pu(w0 + α(p)b)+( 1− p)u(w0 + α(p)a),
O(p)=EQu(w0 + α(p)e x),
and
pbu
0(w0 + α(p)b)+( 1− p)au
0(w0 + α(p)a)=0 . (12)
Before proceeding to characterize the optimal subjective probability of the
high state, it is useful to determine the eﬀect of an increase in this probability
on the optimal demand for the risky asset. By the Inada conditions, α(p)
tends to inﬁnity when p tends to unity, and it tends to minus inﬁnity when p
tends to zero. In the next lemma, we show that an increase in the subjective
probability of the high return state raises the demand for the risky asset.
Lemma 1 The demand for the risky asset is increasing in the subjective
probability of the high return state: ∂α/∂p ≥ 0.




au0(w0 + αa) − bu0(w0 + αb)
pb2u00(w0 + α(p)b)+( 1− p)a2u00(w0 + α(p)a)
. (13)
3See for example Guiso, Jappelli and Terlizzese (1996).
11Both the numerator and the denominator are negative, which implies that
∂α/∂p is positive.¥
This result is linked to the literature on the relationship between the
probability distribution of returns and the optimal demand for the risky
asset. Gollier (1995) provides the necessary and suﬃcient condition on a
change in distribution to raise the demand for the risky asset by all risk-
averse investors. The change in distribution considered in Lemma 1 is a
special case of a stochastic order named monotone probability ratio order by
Eeckhoudt and Gollier (1995) and Athey (2002).
4 The case of small anticipatory feelings
In this section, we explore the special case of small intensities k of anticipa-
tory feelings. When k vanishes, there is no anticipatory feeling at all, and the
lifetime well-being W(p;k = 0) equals the objective expected utility O(p).
It is obvious in this case that the agent selects the subjective probability
p∗





0(w0 + α(Q)b)+( 1− p
∗
0)au
0(w0 + α(Q)a)=0 . (14)
It is easy to check that there exists a single probability p∗
0 ∈ [0,1] that satisﬁes
equation (14). It is well-known that α(Q) has the same sign as the objective
expected return EQe x.
We now examine the impact of introducing a small degree k of anticipa-
tory feelings on the optimal subjective probability p∗(k) of the high return
state. From above, we know that it tends to p∗
0 when k tends to zero. We
hereafter determine the sign of ∂p∗/∂k at k = 0. In order to do this, we ﬁrst
establish the local concavity of the lifetime well-being with respect to the
subjective probability of theh i g hr e t u r ns t a t e ,w h e nk is small.
Lemma 2 Consider any probability distribution P in B(α(Q)) ⊂ X[a,b].
Consider any pair (P1,P 2) in X2[a,b] and any scalar λ ∈ [0,1] such that
P = λP1 +( 1− λ)P2.
It implies that
O(P) ≥ λO(P1)+( 1− λ)O(P2).
12Proof: Let αi denote the optimal demand under beliefs Pi : αi = α(Pi).
We have that
λO(P1)+( 1− λ)O(P2)=λEQu(w0 + α1e x)+( 1− λ)EQu(w0 + α2e x)
= EQ[λu(w0 + α1e x)+( 1− λ)u(w0 + α2e x)].
The concavity of u implies that
λu(w0 + α1x)+( 1− λ)u(w0 + α2x) ≤ u(w0 +( λα1 +( 1− λ)α2)x)
for all x.I ti m p l i e st h a t
λO(P1)+( 1− λ)O(P2) ≤ EQu(w0 +( λα1 +( 1− λ)α2)e x).
We conclude that
λO(P1)+( 1− λ)O(P2) ≤ max
α EQu(w0 + αe x)=O(Q).
Because P belongs to B(α(Q)), we know that O(Q)=O(P). This concludes
the proof.¥
This lemma implies in particular that the objective expected utility O(P)
is locally concave in the neighborhood of any subjective probability distri-
bution P yielding the optimal rational expectation portfolio α(Q). In Ap-
pendix A, we show that O is usually not globally concave. However, because
EQu(w0 + αe x)i sc o n c a v ei nα, and because α is increasing in the subjective
probability p of the high state as stated in Lemma 1, O is single-peaked in
p. It implies that the ﬁrst-order condition of program (11) is necessary and
suﬃcient when k is small.










+k[u(w0 + αb) − u(w0 + αa)]
+(1 − k)





Because α maximizes EPu(w0 +αe x), the ﬁrst term in the right-hand side of
this equality is zero. Using equation (13), we can thus rewrite the ﬁrst-order





∗;k)=k[u(w0 + αb) − u(w0 + αa)] (15)
−(1 − k)
[bu0(w0 + αb) − au0(w0 + αa)]EQe xu0(w0 + αe x)
p∗b2u00(w0 + α(p)b)+( 1− p∗)a2u00(w0 + α(p)a)
. (16)
When k =0 , we verify that this condition simpliﬁes to EQe xu0(w0 +αe x)=0 ,
which is true only if α = α(Q). This yields in turn p∗ = p∗
0 as deﬁned by
(14). Because W is locally concave in p around p∗
0, the optimal subjective
probability p∗ is increasing in k around k = 0 if and only if the cross-derivative
of W is positive when evaluated at (p∗





0;0)=u(w0 + α(Q)b) − u(w0 + α(Q)a).
The right-hand side of this equality has the same sign as α(Q). Thus the
sign of ∂α/∂k has the same sign as α(Q). Combining this result with Lemma
1 yields the next proposition. It relies on the degree of optimism which can
be measured by the diﬀerence between the subjective probability and the
objective probability of the state that is more favorable to the agent’s wealth.
When α(Q), the favorable state is the high return state, and an increase in
p represents an increase in optimism. When α(Q) is negative, the investor
goes short on the risky asset, and the favorable state is the low return state.
The degree of optimism is inversely related to p in that case.
Proposition 4 Introducing small anticipatory feelings in the lifetime objec-





¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
k=0
≥ 0.




¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
k=0
≥ 0.
These inequalities are strict when the objective expected return EQe x is not
zero.
14The intuition of this result is simple. Suppose that the objective expected
return is positive, so that the optimal demand α(Q) for the risky asset is
positive when there is no anticipatory feeling. It is sustained by the beliefs
that the probability of the high return b is p∗
0. Consider a marginal increase in
the subjective probability of that state. It marginally increases the demand
for the risky asset. But, by the envelope theorem, this marginal increase in
demand has no eﬀect on the objective expected utility. To the contrary, it
increases the subjective expected utility. Globally, when k>0, it raises the
lifetime well-being. This argument cannot be extended to consumers having
a larger intensity of anticipatory feelings. Indeed, in this case, a marginal
change in the subjective probability distribution would have an eﬀect on the
objective expected utility.
In Figures 1 and 2, we illustrate Proposition 4 by assuming that the agent
has a power utility function with constant relative risk aversion γ =3 .T h e
worst possible return is a = −100%, whereas the best possible return is b =
+150%. The objective probability distribution is Q ∼ (−1,1/2;+1.5,1/2),
yielding a positive expected excess return. In Figure 1, we have drawn the
optimal subjective probability of the high return as a function of the intensity
k of anticipatory feelings. In Figure 2, we depicted the relationship between
k and the optimal share of wealth invested in the risky asset. As stated in
Proposition 4, we get upward sloping curves. When there is no anticipatory
feeling, the optimal share of wealth invested in the risky asset equals 5.5%.
When anticipatory feelings count as much as the objective future felicity
(k =0 .5), this optimal share goes up to 21.0%.
5 The case of large anticipatory feelings
We have seen in the previous section that the lifetime well-being W as a func-
tion of the subjective probability of success is locally concave and globally
single-peaked when k is small. This does not need to be the case when antic-
ipatory feelings play a more important role in the measurement of welfare.
When k tends to unity, W(p;k) tends to the subjective expected utility S(p).
As seen in deﬁnition (1), S(p) is the maximum of various linear functions of
p. Therefore, S(p) is a convex function of the subjective probability p of the
high return. Thus, when k =1 , the optimal probability p∗
1 must be either
0 or 1. In both case, the subjective expected utility tends to u(+∞). The








Figure 1: Optimal probability of the high return state, as a function of
the intensity of anticipatory feelings. Parameter values: γ =3 ,Q∼
(−1,1/2;+1.5,1/2).








Figure 2: The demand for the risky asset, as a function of the intensity of
anticipatory feelings. Parameter values: γ =3 ,Q∼ (−1,1/2;+1,1/2).
16optimal exposure to the portfolio risk is unbounded.
Suppose without loss of generality that the decision-maker with k =1
selects p∗
0 = 1. Of course, this solution is not feasible when k is smaller
than unity, since it yields a negative ﬁn a lw e a l t hi na l ls t a t e sw i t han e g a t i v e
excess return. It implies that the agent with k<1 must reduce his subjective
probability of the high return. This must be done in order to induce him to
reduce his demand for the risky asset in such a way that w0 + α(p)a be
positive.
Proposition 5 T h es u b j e c t i v ee x p e c t e du t i l i t yS(p) is a convex function of
the subjective probability of the high return state. It implies that the optimal
subjective probability is either 0 or 1 when only anticipatory feelings matter
(k =1 ). When k is smaller than unity, p∗ is positive and less than unity.
When k is smaller than unity, W is a convex combination of a convex
function S and of a single-peaked function O.T h e s e a r c h f o r a n o p t i m a l
subjective probability may be complex in such an environment. To illustrate,
let us consider the case of constant relative risk aversion γ =3 ,w 0 =1 ,
together with a = −100% and b = +100%. We assume that the objective
distribution of returns is Q ∼ (−1,1/2;+1,1/2 ) .I nF i g u r e3 ,w eh a v ed r a w n
the lifetime well-being W as a function of the subjective probability p for
v a r i o u sv a l u e so fk.W h e nk is smaller than or equal to 1/2, W is globally
single-peaked and the optimal subjective probability is p∗ =1 /2, implying
that investing only in the riskfree asset is optimal. This is an example where
the optimal subjective probability distribution coincides with the objective
ones.
When k is in ]1/2,1[, function W exhibits a concave-convex-concave
shape, with two symmetric optimal beliefs. The optimal subjective prob-
ability that is larger than one-half is ﬁrst constant and then increasing in
k, as seen in Figure 4. Notice that the existence of two symmetric optima
shows that providing zero-sum gambling opportunities can be helpful to im-
prove welfare in an homogeneous economy of risk-averse agents. Suppose
that two agents with constant relative risk aversion γ =3a n dw i t ha ni n -
tensity k =0 .6 of anticipatory feelings are considering playing Head-or-Tail
game with a fair coin. In this economy, there is a competitive equilibrium
where each agent puts α(p∗)=2 1 .2% of initial wealth at stake by betting on
either Head or Tail, optimally subjectively believing to have a probability of
success of p∗ =7 8 ,43%.











Figure 3: The lifetime well-being as a function of the subjective probability of
the high return, for various intensities k of anticipatory feelings. Parameter
values: γ =3 ,Q∼ (−1,1/2;+1,1/2).







Figure 4: The optimal subjective probability p∗ as a function of the intensity
k of anticipatory feelings. Parameter values: γ =3 ,Q∼ (−1,1/2;+1,1/2).
186 Approximate solution
Suppose that | α | is small. It implies that we can approximate u0(w0 + αx)
by u0(w0)+αxu00(w0), which is equal to u0(w0)(1−αxA0), where A0 = A(w0).
First-order condition (12) is thus approximated as
[pb +( 1− p)a] − αA0
£
pb







pb +( 1− p)a
pb2 +( 1− p)a2. (17)
Using second-order Taylor approximations for u(w0+αx) yields in turn that
S(p)=pu(w0 + α(p)a)+( 1− p)u(w0 + α(p)a)
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Let mi = EQe xi denote the objective moment of order i of e x. Using again
second-order Taylor approximations yields








pb +( 1− p)a
pb2 +( 1− p)a2
·
2m1 −
pb +( 1− p)a
pb2 +( 1− p)a2m2
¸
.
C o m b i n i n gt h e s et w oo b s e r v a t i o n si m p l i e st h a t







pb +( 1− p)a
pb2 +( 1− p)a2
½
pb +( 1− p)a





2 +( 1− p)a
2¤
− (1 − k)m2
¢




It is noteworthy that this approximation is exact when u is quadratic. We
thus obtain the following interesting insight.
19Proposition 6 When u is quadratic in the relevant domain of wealth, the
optimal subjective probability is independent of the consumer’s attitude to-
wards risk. It maximizes function F deﬁned by (19), where m1 and m2 are
the objective ﬁrst two moments of the excess return of the risky asset.
The ﬁrst-order condition associated to the maximization of F(p)i se q u i v -
alent to ﬁnding the roots of a third-degree polynomial. This is in line with
the observation made in relation to Figure 3 that ∂2W/∂p2 can alternate
twice in sign, with W having a concave-convex-concave shape. We check
that in the special case with no anticipatory feeling (k =0 ) ,F is concave in
p with a maximum p∗
0 such that
p∗
0b +( 1− p∗
0)a
p∗





This means that the subjective probability p∗
0 is selected in such a way that
t h eo b j e c t i v ea n ds u b j e c t i v eS h a r p er a t i o sb et h es a m e .I ty i e l d st h es a m e
optimal portfolio than the one that is optimal under rational expectation.
When the utility function is not quadratic in the relevant domain, the
solution presented in Proposition 6 is only an approximation of the optimal
solution. This is a good approximation only when the optimal portfolio risk
| α(p∗) | is small. This is the case for example when m1/m2 is small in
absolute value and k is small. The ﬁrst condition implies that the absolute
value of α(Q) is small, whereas the second condition means that α(p∗)i sc l o s e
to α(Q). To illustrate, consider again the case with a = −100%,b= +150%,
Q ∼ (−1,1/2;1.5,1/2), w0 =1 ,k=0 .1 together with a constant relative
risk aversion equaling γ =3 . I nF i g u r e5 ,w ec o m p a r et h et r u eW(p)a n d
the approximated one speciﬁed in equation (18). The optimal subjective
probability of the high return is equal to p∗ =0 .513. It corresponds to an
optimal share of wealth invested in stocks equaling α(p∗)=6 .17%, which is
small. The approximate solution gives p∗ ' 0.515. We see that the size of the
error of the approximation is small for intermediate values of p.W h e np goes
closer to 0 or 1, the induced portfolio risk becomes large, and the quality of
the approximation deteriorates dramatically. This is because the quadratic
utility functions do not satisfy the Inada conditions.
An important question is to determine whether the heterogeneity in risk
aversion can explain the heterogeneity of subjective beliefs in the population.








Figure 5: The true W-curve (plain) and the approximate W-curve (dashed)
as a function of the subjective probability of the high return state. Parameter
values: γ =3 ,Q∼ (−1,1/2;+1.5,1/2),k=0 .1.
When preferences belong to the quadratic class, the optimal subjective proba-
bility distribution is independent of the degree of risk aversion of the investor.
When the utility function is not quadratic, optimal beliefs are generally not
independent of risk preferences. Brunnermeier and Parker (2003) conclude
that the heterogeneity of risk aversion in the population could explain the
heterogeneity of subjective beliefs. However, because smooth functions can
always be well approximated by a quadratic utility function in a small do-
main, we should not expect to generate a lot of heterogeneity on beliefs in an
economy with small portfolio risks at equilibrium. The assumption of small
portfolio risks is compatible with the general tone of the literature on the
equity premium puzzle. The puzzle is based on the observation that actual
portfolio risks are very small compared to the optimal risk computed on the
basis of the large objective risk premium on ﬁnancial markets. We illustrate
the low sensitivity of optimal beliefs to changes in risk aversion by consider-
ing again the numerical example used above. We examine in particular the
eﬀect of a change in the relative risk aversion γ on the optimal subjective
probability of the high state. This relationship is described in Figure 6. The
most striking aspect of this ﬁgure is the range of the vertical axe: as relative







Figure 6: The impact of risk aversion on optimal beliefs. Parameter values:
Q ∼ (−1,1/2;+1.5,1/2), k =0 .1.
risk aversion varies from 0.5t o1 0 , the optimal subjective probability of the
high state varies within interval [0.5126,0.5131]!
7 Concluding remarks
We have shown that the selection of optimal beliefs in the one-riskfree-one-
risky-asset portfolio problem is governed by very precise rules. First, we
have shown that these beliefs must be degenerated at the worst and best
possible returns. This is compatible with the observation that subjects in
experimental studies tend to distort probabilities in favor of extreme events,
as suggested for example by the cumulative prospect theory. Second, when
the intensity of anticipatory feelings is small, the problem of selecting be-
liefs is well-behaved (single-peaked), yielding a unique optimal subjective
probability distribution. Except in the case of a zero objective expected
excess return, this optimal beliefs always yield an increase in the optimal
risk exposure when compared to the one that is optimal under the objective
probability distribution. Moreover, investors with a larger intensity of antic-
ipatory feelings raise their subjective probability of the good state together
with their optimal risk exposure. When the optimal portfolio risk is small,
22we showed that optimal beliefs are almost insensitive to the degree of risk
aversion of the investor.
Because the mental process of distorting beliefs in favor of savoring the
prospect of large capital gains, the induced optimism of investors will not be
helpful to solve the equity premium puzzle, quite the contrary. The problem
is more complex when anticipatory feelings play a larger role in the measure-
ment of well-being. In particular, we showed that the objective function may
not be concave in the subjective probability distribution, thereby yielding
potential bifurcation and multiple local maxima.
This work calls for more investigations in several directions. First, it
would be interesting to examine a more general model in which more risk-
taking opportunities are available. This would be useful in order to examine
the eﬀect of anticipatory feelings on the optimal diversiﬁcation of individual
asset portfolios. Second, the current model does not take into account of the
adverse eﬀect of disappointment of the optimally optimistic investors when
they will eventually be forced to recognize the objective performance of their
asset portfolio. Third, this work suggests that delegating the selection of
the individual asset portfolios to an independent agent can be eﬃcient.
This would neutralize the negative eﬀect on portfolio choices of distorting
individual beliefs.
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25Appendix A: The objective expected utility is not globally
concave in the subjective probability distribution
In this Appendix, we show that O needs not be globally concave in P.
We consider the following counter-example. The consumer’s relative risk
aversion is a constant equaling γ =0 .1. We normalize initial wealth to
unity. The extreme possible returns are a = −1a n db =1 . T h eo b j e c t i v e
probability distribution is Q ∼ (−1,1/2;+1,1/2). By Lemma 2, we know
that O is locally concave around p∗
0 =1 /2. In Figure 7, we draw the objective
expected utility O(p) as a function of the probability of the high return. O
is not globally concave. However, it is single-peaked.










Figure 7: The objective expected utility O as a function of the subjective
probability p, when Q ∼ (−1,1/2;+1,1/2) and u(z)=z0.9/0.9.
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